

Complex economic activities concentrate in large cities

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Human activities, such as research, innovation and industry, concentrate disproportionately in large cities. The ten most innovative cities in the United States account for 23% of the national population, but for 48% of its patents and 33% of its gross domestic product. But why has human activity become increasingly concentrated? Here we use data on scientific papers, patents, employment and gross domestic product, for 353 metropolitan areas in the United States, to show that the spatial concentration of productive activities increases with their complexity. Complex economic activities, such as biotechnology, neurobiology and semiconductors, concentrate disproportionately in a few large cities compared to less-complex activities, such as apparel or paper manufacturing. We use multiple proxies to measure the complexity of activities, finding that complexity explains from 40% to 80% of the variance in urban concentration of occupations, industries, scientific fields and technologies. Using historical patent data, we show that the spatial concentration of cutting-edge technologies has increased since 1850, suggesting a reinforcing cycle between the increase in the complexity of activities and urbanization. These findings suggest that the growth of spatial inequality may be connected to the increasing complexity of the economy.

With a gross domestic product (GDP) of US\$1.4 trillion, the New York metro area generates more wealth than Australia, Spain or Mexico. With 1.39 patents per 1,000 people, the San Francisco Bay Area produced, in 2000, more than 12% of all of the patenting activity of the United States. Economic activities are known to concentrate in space, and that concentration appears to be increasing. In 15 years, the Bay Area more than doubled its rate of invention, growing to nearly 20% of all patents produced in the United States in 2015. But what factors explain this unprecedented concentration of knowledge and wealth in large cities? And why has the spatial concentration of activities increased in a world dominated by digital communications and international travel?

One factor may be the growth of complex economic activities: activities requiring a deep division of knowledge and labour. As an example, consider the division of labour involved in producing a single research paper in immunology. Immunology contributions usually require collaborations among people with narrow and complementary expertise. You may need experts in specific pathways and proteins, such as NF- κ B or Toll-like receptors, people experienced in *in vivo* murine biology and people with experience in a variety of laboratory techniques, such as flow cytometry. Depending on the nature of the contribution, you may also need to include people with clinical experience, which—once again—can be specific for each autoimmune disorder. This deep division of knowledge and labour is required in fields such as immunology or microbiology because it is not possible to accumulate all of that expertise in one or two people. In simple words, we can say that the complexity of this activity is large, not because each of the individuals involved is more skilled than people working in other activities, but because the activity requires a large network of people with deep expertise in complementary knowledge domains.

Our hypothesis is that complex industries, such as biotechnology and semiconductors, exhibit a much greater degree of spatial concentration than less complex industries, such as apparel and furniture manufacturing. This could help explain the rise in importance of superstar cities¹, and also contribute to our understanding of growing spatial inequality. In fact, as we show in this paper, the complexity of activities can account for approximately 40% to 80% of the variance in urban concentration across occupations, industries, scientific fields and technologies. This differs from literature in urban economics focused on the urban sorting of college graduates^{2,3}, instead of the complexity of innovative and productive activities.

We can draw a link between urban concentration and the complexity of economic activities by combining recent advances from development economics^{4–7} and urban scaling^{8–10}. On the one hand, scholars working on economic development have created methods to measure the complexity of economies (for example, countries and cities) and that of the activities present in them (for example, products and patents)^{4,5}. On the other hand, scholars working in urban concentration have shown that output scales superlinearly with a city's population, which means that output per capita is larger in bigger cities^{8–10}. This superlinear scaling is known to vary across activities¹¹, although it is unclear why. Here, we bring these two bodies of literature together by revealing that the urban concentration of activities increases with their complexity.

Why should we expect a link between complexity and spatial concentration? More complex activities require a deeper division of knowledge¹², compelling individuals to narrow down their expertise and specialize¹³. This division of knowledge creates high coordination costs, since specialized knowledge needs to be reconstituted to be put to work. Cities help solve the coordination problems created by the division of knowledge by creating multiple mixing and

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matching opportunities^{10,14,15}. In fact, economists have found that during the last decades college graduates have increasingly sorted themselves into high-wage, high-rent cities^{2,3}. Cities are also home to a variety of knowledge spillover mechanisms^{16–20}, such as labour flows^{21–23}, spin-offs²⁴ and dense social networks²⁵. Moreover, cities are also the preferred location of multiple private and public institutions focused on accumulating complex knowledge, such as research universities and private laboratories²⁶. Together, these multiple reinforcing channels provide the increasing returns expressed in the superlinear scaling of output across cities. We expect this superlinear scaling to be more pronounced for complex activities, since increasing returns are stronger in sectors that are more intense in knowledge than in labour or capital²⁷.

In the following pages, we explore the link between complexity and spatial concentration by first measuring the urban scaling^{8,9} of papers, patents, scientific papers, occupation and industries, and then exploring whether differences in the observed scaling exponents are explained by an activity's level of complexity^{4,5}. Our findings show that complex activities concentrate more in large cities than less complex activities, and that the spatial concentration of complex activities has increased over time, contributing to our understanding of spatial inequality²⁸ and of the spatial organization of the economy.

Results

Figure 1 shows the urban concentration of research papers (Fig. 1a), patents (Fig. 1b), occupations (Fig. 1c) and industries (Fig. 1d) in the United States. Peaks are respectively proportional to the number of patents, the number of research papers, GDP and the total employment of each metro area. In all four examples, we find activities to be highly concentrated, especially in large cities. Figure 1e–h characterizes this urban concentration by showing the scaling laws followed by patents, research papers, industries and occupations. Scaling laws in cities follow power-law relationships of the form $y \approx x^\beta$, where x is the population of a city, y is a measure of output (patents, papers, GDP or jobs), and β is the scaling exponent. In the case of research papers (Fig. 1e), the number of papers published by authors in a metro area grows as the $\beta = 1.54$ power of the population. For patents, the patents granted to a city scale superlinearly with population with an exponent of $\beta = 1.26$. Similarly, total employment grows as the $\beta = 1.04$ power of the population in a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and GDP scales as the $\beta = 1.11$ power of population.

We repeat this exercise by studying the scaling laws followed by specific research areas, technologies, occupations and industries. Figure 1j compares the scaling laws followed by patents in 'computer hardware and software' and 'pipes and joints'. Patents in 'computer hardware and software' concentrate more in large cities ($\beta = 1.57$) than patents in 'pipes and joints', which exhibit only a modest superlinear scaling ($\beta = 1.1$). Similarly, we observe large variations in the scaling coefficients of intuitively more and less knowledge intense research areas (Fig. 1i), occupations (Fig. 1l) and industries (Fig. 1k). Figures including each category of patents, papers, industries and occupations are available in Supplementary Section 2.

In Fig. 2, we explore the relationship between the urban concentration and the complexity of activities. For technologies, we proxy knowledge complexity using the age of the knowledge combined in patents, measured as the average year of appearance of the subclasses in which a patent makes a knowledge claim. Alternatively, we use the average number of inventors in a patent and the NK complexity measure of Fleming and Sorensen²⁹ (see Supplementary Information). The year of appearance of a subclass assumes that patents recombining more recent knowledge are, on average, more complex³⁰. For scientific fields, we proxy knowledge complexity as the average size of the team involved in a scientific publication^{31,32}. For occupations and industries, knowledge complexity is proxied

by the average years of education of the employees working in an occupation or industry. As we compare the spatial concentration of activities with their knowledge complexity, we avoid using measures of complexity that are derived from spatial information⁴. For more information about these definitions and robustness analyses, see Supplementary Section 3.

Figure 2a–d compares the urban concentration of activities with their respective scaling exponents. In all cases, we observe that the spatial concentration of activities increases with their complexity. For scientific fields, it increases with the average number of authors in a paper (Pearson's $r = 0.72$, $P < 1 \times 10^{-3}$), for technologies, it increases with the recency of the combined subclasses (Pearson's $r = 0.82$, $P < 1 \times 10^{-3}$) and with the average number of inventors in a patent ($r = 0.48$, $P < 1 \times 10^{-2}$), for occupations, it increases with the average years of education of the workers within that occupational category (Pearson's $r = 0.62$, $P < 1 \times 10^{-3}$), and for industries, it increases with the years of education of the workers employed in that industry (Pearson's $r = 0.70$, $P < 1 \times 10^{-3}$). In all four cases, the more complex the activity, the more superlinearly it scales with population, meaning that more complex activities concentrate more in large cities. We confirm the statistical significance of this relationship using regression analysis and a variety of alternative measures of spatial concentration and complexity (see Supplementary Section 3). For instance, we find that more complex patents of the same age still concentrate more in cities. In the Supplementary Information, we set up a model predicting the number of patents produced in a city in a technology as a function of a city's population, the NK complexity and recency of a technology, and an interaction term between a city's population and each measure of complexity (see Supplementary Information), finding that both measures of complexity are mutually significant.

Next, we examine historical patent data, spanning 150 years, to investigate whether the spatial concentration of activities has increased over time.

Figure 3a shows the scaling exponent observed for the top 25% most complex patents—those that recombine newer knowledge—granted each decade between 1850 and 2010 (red line). The figure reveals that the urban concentration of the most complex technologies has increased continuously for the past 150 years, accelerating with each industrial revolution. Starting with the second industrial revolution (1870), the urban scaling of complex technologies becomes increasingly superlinear, growing from a scaling exponent of $\beta \approx 1.15$ in 1870 to $\beta \approx 1.55$ by the 1930s. The urban concentration of the most complex patents then plateaus, increasing again after the third industrial revolution (1970s) and reaching a scaling exponent of almost 1.8 in 2010. The least complex patents (blue line) have always been less geographically concentrated than the most complex patents. After the 1970s, their urban concentration started to decrease, with the scaling exponent falling to less than 1.2. The information technology revolution has therefore been followed by an increasing concentration of the most complex technologies in cities, and a decreasing urban concentration of the least complex ones. Robustness analyses can be found in Supplementary Section 4.

We note that these results cannot be due to cities growing faster than rural areas, since cities becoming more populated relatively to rural areas would reduce the spatial concentration of the activities present in them (the β exponent). For the growth of urban areas to drive up the concentration of an activity, urban areas would need to generate employment in those activities faster than population growth.

We further our exploration of the evolution of the spatial concentration of patents by separating patents into the six main technological categories defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research: 'mechanical', 'chemical', 'electrical and electronic', 'computers and communication', 'drugs and medical' and 'others'. Figure 3b shows the scaling exponent observed for each of these technological




Fig. 1 | Spatial concentration of activities. a–d, Maps of the spatial concentration of research papers (a), patents (b), employment (c) and GDP (d) in the US MSAs. **e–h**, Scaling relations between the population of an MSA and the total number of research papers published from 1996 to 2008 (e), patents granted from 2000 to 2009 (f), the number of employees in 2015 (g) and the GDP of industries in 2015 (h). In **e–h** the grey line shows what would be expected if the scaling relationship was linear. **i–l**, Scaling relationships for pairs of activities with large differences in their scaling exponents: research papers in ‘neuroscience’ and ‘arts and humanities’ (i), patents in ‘computer hardware and software’ and ‘pipes and joints’ (j), employment in ‘computer and mathematical’ occupations and in ‘installation, maintenance, and repair’ (k) and output (GDP) of ‘professional and scientific activities’ and ‘retail trade’ (l).

categories by decade between 1850 and 2010. ‘Mechanical’ and ‘others’ are the technologies that exhibit the highest scaling in the mid-nineteenth century, meaning that they were the most concentrated

in large cities, with ‘others’ mostly composed of patents related to textiles during this period. However, the scaling exponent of these categories does not grow substantially during the following decades,




Fig. 2 | Urban concentration increases with knowledge complexity. **a–d**, Urban concentration of activities, as captured by the scaling exponent, increases with the average number of authors in a publication in a field (**a**), the average year of introduction of a patent’s subclasses (and the average number of inventors in a patent (inset)) (**b**), the average years of education of workers within an occupational category (**c**) and the average years of education of the workers employed in an industry (**d**).

meaning that most of the rise in scaling observed after 1870 for all patents (Fig. 3a) can be attributed to an increase in the urban concentration of ‘electrical and electronic’ patents. Starting in 1950, ‘computers and communications’ and ‘drugs and medical’ become increasingly more concentrated, reaching the highest scaling exponents observed for all categories. Together, these results show that the urban concentration of patenting activity exhibits a long-term cycle, rising during the heyday of the technologies developed, and then declining as technologies mature.

Discussion

The core idea of this paper is that differences in the complexity of activities explain variations in the degree to which they agglomerate. We show this correlation to be true for the production of scientific papers and patents, for employment in multiple occupations, and for the output of industries. We argue that complex activities tend to be more concentrated in large urban areas because they require a deep division of knowledge that is distributed across many actors. This also suggests that much of the knowledge needed to perform complex activities—which may be tacit^{33,34}—is subject to spillover mechanisms that are local, by virtue of being embodied in social networks⁶, or because they flow together with labour^{21,22}, come from spin-offs²⁴ or require supporting local institutions, such as universities and private research centres²⁶. Complex knowledge, therefore, does not travel well through digital communication channels and requires the richness of cities to be properly accumulated.

However, the dynamics of urban agglomeration are not static. When we look at the history of patenting activity in the US, we find that the concentration of patenting activity in urban areas has increased during most of the last century and a half, especially for more complex activities. During the third industrial revolution the concentration of the most complex and the least complex activities diverged. This could explain why the world has become flatter for some activities³⁵ and more spiky for others³⁶, and could be a reflection of an increase in the relative employment of more complex economic activities.

The idea that complex economic activities concentrate more in a few large cities poses a range of questions for planners and policymakers. It tells us that countries need to rethink their urbanization and transportation strategies. The economy of the future may well be dominated by those countries that succeed at developing the industrial policies^{20,37–41} and megacities required to accumulate and process vast amounts of knowledge. Some countries in the East, especially China, have been successful at developing large megalopolises, such as the Yangtze River Delta Megalopolis (150 million people, including cities such as Shanghai, Nanjing and Hangzhou) or the Pearl River Delta Megalopolis (70 million people, including Hong Kong, Shenzhen and Guangdong). These megalopolises have been made possible by investments in transportation and housing that dwarf the efforts of the West. Of course, this does not mean that the West should copy the modernist efforts of China verbatim. However, it does suggest the need to think about the transportation,




Fig. 3 | Evolution of the urban scaling of technologies. **a**, The scaling exponent of the top 25% most complex technologies increases throughout the observation period, while that of the bottom 25% of technologies based on complexity peaks in 1960 and then decreases. The scaling exponent for all patents increases from 1850 to 1930, and then remains relatively stable until 2000. **b**, The scaling exponent of the six main patent categories between 1850 and 2010.

housing and densification strategies that the West will need to develop to remain competitive in the high complexity activities of the future.

Of course, our study has limitations that need to be taken into consideration. The descriptive nature of our analysis does not provide a clear indication of the mechanisms connecting complexity and spatial concentration, or the causes leading to increases in both. For instance, a city's location within the global network of knowledge flows may provide an advantage to its ability of generate employment in complex activities. Furthermore, because we mostly use cross-sectional data, we cannot look at the dynamics of these relationships beyond the case of patenting activity. Moreover, United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) classification recency is not a perfect measure of technological complexity, although it is correlated with other measures of technological complexity, such as NK and the average number of inventors in a patent.

If knowledge complexity and agglomeration cannot be divorced, the spatial inequality observed among large and small cities is likely to increase. Policymakers must recognize that the mechanisms generating growth and innovation may be the same as those that are contributing to the growth of inequality, both within and between cities. We face critical questions regarding the future of economic growth and the distribution of the returns and costs of economic activity within a world of growing unevenness²⁸ across multiple spatial scales.

Methods

We analyse the urban concentration of economic activities in the United States. We interchangeably refer to cities, metropolitan areas and urban areas. For the analysis, the spatial delimitation of these urban areas corresponds to the core-based

statistical areas (CBSAs) defined by the United States Office of Management and Budget. CBSAs are statistical units, not administrative units. They are county aggregates, and refer to an urban area that includes a central city and the surrounding communities that are economically linked to this city (commuting patterns and shared labour market). Figures 1 and 2 report findings based on cities for which we have data on all four economic activities (patents, scientific publications, industries and occupations); that is, 353 MSAs. For Fig. 3, we analyse only historical patent data and are able to analyse patenting activity in all CBSAs (metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas; that is, 923 observations). In the Supplementary Information, we present these three figures using alternative sets of cities. We use population data from the US Census (population in year 2000 for scientific publications and patents, estimated population in year 2015 for industries and occupations; for historical patents we use US Census population for each corresponding decade from 1850 to 2010). In the Supplementary Information, we also check the robustness of our results for occupations and industries using data for Brazilian cities (mesoregions).

We use patent data sourced from the USPTO, which provides inventor addresses for patents granted from 1975 onwards. For historical patents (1850–1974), we use HistPat. HistPat was built using optically recognized and publicly available documents from the USPTO, combining text-mining algorithms with statistical models to provide geographical information for older patents⁴². We disaggregate patents into 30 technologies as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (two-digit subcategories)⁴³. For the 1975–2010 period, we use the Patent Network Dataverse. In total, we analyse 8,731,024 patents from 1850 to 2010. In the main text, we consider only technologies for which there are more than 200 cities with any recorded activity and we remove categories that are based on natural advantages: 'agriculture, husbandry, food', 'agriculture, food, textiles' and 'earth working and wells'. In the Supplementary Information, we also present results including these additional categories.

For scientific papers, we use publication data from Elsevier's Scopus database covering the time period 1996–2008^{44,45}. Publications are disaggregated into 23 scientific disciplines as defined by the Scopus classification (two-digit major thematic categories). These data have kindly been provided by Ö. Nomaler, K. Frenken and G. Heimeriks. We analyse a total of 4,400,000 scientific publications. The data include documents that have at least one author who has (at least) one affiliation to a US scientific organization. In the main text, we consider only

scientific fields for which there are more than 200 cities with any recorded activity and we remove categories that are based on natural advantages: 'agricultural and biological sciences', 'environmental science', 'Earth and planetary sciences' and 'veterinary'. In the Supplementary Information, we also present results including these categories.

For industries, we use 2015 GDP data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis to quantify the economic output of MSAs in 18 industries as defined by the North American Industry Classification System (two-digit NAICS). In the main text, we consider only industries for which there are more than 200 cities with any recorded activity and we remove categories that are based on natural advantages: 'agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting' and 'utilities'. In the Supplementary Information, we also present results including these categories.

For occupations, we use 2015 employment statistics from the Bureau of Labor Statistics disaggregated into 22 occupations according to the Standard Occupational Classification system (two-digit SOC). For occupations, we use 2015 employment statistics from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In the main text, we consider only occupations for which there are more than 200 cities with any recorded activity and we remove categories that are based on natural advantages: 'farming, fishing, and forestry'. In the Supplementary Information, we also present results including this category. See Supplementary Section 1 for descriptive statistics on these data (Supplementary Figs. 1–4).

Reporting Summary. Further information on research design is available in the Nature Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.

Data availability

The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon request.

Code availability

The code that supports the findings of this study is available from the corresponding author upon request.

Received: 7 May 2019; Accepted: 2 December 2019;

Published online: 13 January 2020

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Acknowledgements

We thank Ö. Nomaler, K. Frenken and G. Heimeriks for providing the data on scientific publications used in the main text, and G. Patience, C. Patience, B. Blais and F. Bertrand for providing the data on the age of references listed in scientific publications. We also thank R. Boschma, K. Frenken, M. Storper, A. J. Scott, T. Broekel, B. Jun, F. Pinheiro, A. Alshamsi and F. Neffke for useful comments and suggestions. Financial support from the Regional Studies Association through the Early Career Grant awarded to P.-A.B. is gratefully acknowledged. C.A.H. acknowledges support from the MIT Media Lab consortia, from the MIT-Skoltech seed grant and from the MIT-Masdar initiative. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish or preparation of the manuscript.

Author contributions

P.-A.B., C.J.-F., S.G.P., M.P.A.S., D.L.R. and C.A.H. all contributed equally to the work and have supervised it jointly.

Competing interests

The authors declare no competing interests.

Additional information

Supplementary information is available for this paper at <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-019-0803-3>.

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Peer review information Primary Handling Editors: Mary Elizabeth Sutherland; Stavroula Kousta.

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